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About the South-South Tri-Continental Collaborative Programme 
The South-South Tri-continental Programme is a scholarly collaboration for Research, Training, Publishing, and Dissemi-
nation, between the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA); the Asian Political 
and International Studies Association (APISA); and the Latin American Council of Social Science (CLACSO).  The Pro-
gramme was established as a reaction to the need, identified by scholars in the South, to reorient theoretical and meth-
odological frameworks of the dominant development discourses; and to improve the organization of Southern research 
infrastructures.  The Programme aims at reviving cooperation and collaboration among scholars of the global South 
working in the broad field of the social sciences.  The collaboration was entered into with the specific aim of sustaining 
knowledge exchange between scholars on the three continents as a long-term initiative.  At the core of this collabora-
tion are the objectives of 
deepening intra-South networking 
contributing a South perspective towards the transformation of the Social Sciences on a global scale 
producing alternative theoretical and methodological approaches of knowledge building 
Networking and dialoguing take place in the different International Comparative Seminars that the partners set up annu-
ally on a rotational basis.  For each International Seminar, CODESRIA, CLACSO and APISA select representatives from 
their respective continents.  Each themed Seminar brings together a total of no more than twelve senior scholars who 
have been working on the thematic area identified for the Seminar, and are recognized as leaders in such area of schol-
arship.  The small number of participants is meant to enable close, thorough discussion of issues, with a view to produc-
ing scholarly publications that not only make audible the voices of the South in the global arena, but effectively ad-
vance scientific scholarship. 
The CODESRIA-APISA-CLACSO Occasional Paper Series disseminates work discussed at the South-South International 
Comparative Seminars.  The Occasional Papers are written by participants from the three continents, and are designed 
to provide an opportunity for a sustained South-South dialogue, and to enhance the understanding of the current re-
search issues that scholars of the South are actively engaged in.  The papers offer reflections emerging from issues that 
are pertinent to the South; and are informed by experiences from the South, as well as from South-South and South-
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The main argument is that East Asia’s nascent regionalism is driven 
by competition within the region and with NAFTA and the EU. Unlike 
France and Germany which consciously led in European integration 
to avoid a catastrophic war again, the lynchpin of East Asian 
regionalism is actually ASEAN. However, the strategic rivalry 
between the two great Asian powers of China and Japan is also 
driving East Asian regionalism because they are competing to 
establish FTAs, bilaterally and multilaterally, with Southeast Asia.  
The analogy is that ASEAN works like a “Lego Block” which helps to 
link China and Japan together in regionalism even though the two 
countries remain divided by their burden of history and competing to 
become the “top dog” in East Asia. Nevertheless, rising bilateral 
trade valued at US$207 billion in 2006 between China and Japan will 
be an added incentive (though not a sufficient condition) to keep 
their relations on an even keel. 
Presently, there is little consciousness in East Asia that Latin 
America and Africa are natural allies in the South to balance North 
America and Europe. East Asia comprises mixed elements of North 
and South differentiated by material wealth and technological 
capabilities. Moreover, a number of East Asian states (e.g. Japan, 
South Korea and the Philippines) are dependent on the US for their 
military security. I also argue that there are different types, 
configurations and layers of “global hegemonies” --- military, 
political, economic and cultural --- and in the case of 
regionalism, it is difficult for even a unilateral military 
superpower like the US to impose its preferences and will on 
the processes and institutions of regionalism in East Asia which 
are multilateral, pluralistic,  complex and multi-layered. 
 
Outline of the article 
This article will first define the terms “regionalism”, “South” and 
“Global Hegemony”. Then it will examine the engines which drive 
the “concentric circles” of East Asian regionalism (ASEAN, APT, EAS 
and APEC). This paper will also analyze how the impetus and threats 
of “global hegemony” have facilitated --- often unwittingly --- and 
paradoxically also hindered the grand enterprise of East Asian 
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regionalism. Following that is the question whether the rise of China 
in East Asia will challenge US global hegemony and perhaps replace 
it with a “local hegemony”. It will conclude by examining the 
problems and promises of East Asian regionalism and South-South 
alignments in an American global hegemonic system which is eroded 
by Washington’s futile war on terror and marked by instability in the 




The term “regionalism” is a multi-faceted one: institutionalizing a 
larger and broader political entity which transcends the traditional/ 
idealized nation-state; the deepening and broadening of economic 
relations among states, societies and markets leading to a 
discernable economic bloc, and nurturing a cultural community 
based on shared values and a common identity beyond the elite 
level. Presently, only the EU can boast of a close approximation to 
the ideal-type of a region. East Asia remains a distant second. 
NAFTA is subsumed within US hegemony given the preponderance of 
the latter. Sub-Sahara Africa has to struggle to build states and seek 
development out of arguably artificial boundaries mapped by 
European colonial powers. The term African Union (AU) appears to 
be more an aspiration for the future rather than a genuine 
description of present reality. 
With a majority of “Southerners” live in East Asia (demographically 
in China, India and Indonesia), there are also countries in East Asia 
which do not fit in this paradigm --- Japan is a G7 country and 
world’s second largest economic superpower, South Korea is an 
OECD country and another economic powerhouse, and Singapore is 
economically significant beyond its tiny geographical size. There are 
also East Asian countries like Thailand and Malaysia which are 
middle-income countries. In this regard, East Asia comprises both 
North and South and the zone in between. The fragmentary and 
uneven nature of East Asian development gives us a clue why it is 
difficult for East Asia to cooperate within let alone forge an 





I interpret “global hegemony” in the following dimensions:  
* the diffusion of global capitalism based on the “neo-liberal” 
ideology of the Washington Consensus (US Treasury, IMF, World Bank 
and Wall Street) which preaches deregulation and “free” market 
competition as the Way to economic rationality, efficiency and 
growth,  
* the US military which outspends the next 20 countries added 
together,  
* and the “soft power” of the US in terms of values --- the allure of 
democracy, individualism, human rights and capitalist consumerism -
--, cultural products such as Disney, McDonald, MTV and NBA, and 
the source of information technological platforms ---- the Internet, 
Microsoft, Apple and its i-pod.  
I argue that there are “global hegemonies” and not a single and all-
encompassing hegemony. Militarily, no states can challenge and 
withstand the US war machine in conventional wars. (However, the 
main challenge to the Pentagon is asymmetrical and non-
conventional warfare as exemplified by non-state resistance to US 
forces in the streets of Iraq). Nevertheless, even though the US 
economy still is the largest in the world and the US Treasury prints 
paper dollars which are the de facto international currency, its 
economic share of the global pie has shrunk considerably from 
almost half shortly after World War II to barely a quarter today.  
With the rise of China and India, US economic dominance is likely to 
be chipped away even though the US consumer market continues to 
suck in the exports of China, Japan and other East Asian countries. 
In the cultural sphere, American hegemony is the least difficult to 
compete against. Despite American “soft power”, other nations 
including those in East Asia have deep, vibrant and enduring cultural 
traditions which cannot be so easily eroded let alone overwhelmed 
by American or European values. 
 
Engines of East Asian Regionalism: Geopolitics, markets and ideas 
ASEAN, the kernel of East Asian regionalism, was born in the context 
of the Cold War fought between two hegemons --- the US and the 
USSR. Ostensibly set up as an organization in 1967 to promote 
  
Page 7 
economic cooperation among five Southeast Asian countries, the 
geo-political logic was for five non-communist states to band 
together in an era where the region was polarized by the US 
involvement in the Vietnam War against communism. After the end 
of the Cold War, Southeast Asian states, despite their differences in 
political regime-types, formed an expanded ASEAN 10 which would 
carry more weight in international affairs. 
As a result of the colonial legacy, trading ties among the ASEAN 
states is not necessarily the strongest among each other. 
Nevertheless, intra-ASEAN trade and intra East Asian trade (among 
ASEAN, China, Japan and Korea) are gradually rising and by 2006, 
intra-East Asian trade has comprised more than 50 percent of their 
total trade. According to economist Edward Lincoln, between 1981 
and 2001, the share of intra-regional exports within the APT rose 
from 32 percent to 40 percent while intra-regional imports rose from 
32 percent to 50 percent. Simply put, although the US market still is 
critical to many East Asian countries, they have increasingly become 
less dependent on the US. With the economic rise of China, India 
and Vietnam, US economic power will become relatively less 
dominant in East Asia. In this regard, economic ties that bind in East 
Asia are a necessary though not a sufficient condition for 
regionalism. 
The genesis of East Asian regionalism was not driven only by Cold 
War geo-politics and markets but also ideas. Then Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Muhammad envisaged an EAEG (East Asian 
Economic Group) which could compete against NAFTA and the EU. 
However, the idea was still-born after the US hegemon opposed it 
and Tokyo, the loyal ally of Washington, abided by the preference of 
the US despite an initial interest in Mahathir’s EAEG.  
The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-8 was the catalyst to East Asian 
Regionalism. Unlike the American intervention when financial crises 
hit its sphere of influence in debt-ridden Latin America and Mexico 
in the late 1980s (e.g. Brady bonds in 1989 to rescue these 
economies), the US advocated the IMF approach of raising interest 
rates, tight state budgets, austerity measures and deregulation 
which aggravated massive unemployment, poverty and political 
disorder especially in Indonesia and Thailand. There was also the 
East Asian perception that the IMF prescription of deregulation 
amidst the financial crisis benefited western corporations which 
acquired East Asian assets in fire-barn sales. The financial crisis 
forced the ASEAN 10, Japan, China and Korea (Plus Three) to 
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propose the Chiangmai Initiatives, a currency swap arrangement to 
prevent the occurrence of another Asian financial crisis. 
The APT also grew out from an idea of Singapore which advocated a 
dialogue between the top political leaders of East Asia and Western 
Europe --- known as ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) which takes place 
every two years. In actuality, the East Asian countries which 
participated in ASEM are essentially the same members envisaged by 
Malaysia’s Mahathir. However, Singapore and other East Asian 
countries were careful not to couch it in Mahathir’s combative terms 
i.e. as an Asian bloc to keep the US out of the region. Instead, the 
APT is packaged as open regionalism which welcomes good relations 
with NAFTA and the EU. 
While East Asia has embraced regionalism to enhance its clout 
globally, there still is uncertainty about its membership, 
geographical scope and final destination. In the recent East Asian 
Summits (EAS), India, Australia and New Zealand were also 
participants. This raises the question whether the Indian 
subcontinent and Australasia are geographically and culturally part 
of East Asia. However, EAS as ASEAN Plus 6 has a geo-political logic -
-- to bring in India to balance a rising China. Although it is a cliché 
to repeat the East Asian aphorism that a journey of a thousand miles 
begin with a single step, it is difficult to conceive East Asia adopting 
the EU model which pools sovereignty and adopts a common 
currency, with a European parliament and rule making in Brussels 
within the next 50 years. Located at different levels of economic 
development, possessing different regime-types and cultural roots, 
many East Asian countries have yet to complete their arduous 
project of national building let alone to embrace regionalism which 
transcends nationalism.  
In the case of APEC which includes the US, Russia, Papua New 
Guinea and Latin American countries like Mexico, Chile and Peru, 
the 21 members (comprising economies rather than states) are so 
diverse making it difficult for any entities including the US to 
dominate it. While APEC provides a good platform for photo 
opportunities for top leaders, it is a non-binding institution unable 
to move beyond the lowest common denominator of a watered-down 
consensus. Case in point is the 2007 APEC meeting in Sydney, 
Australia where members gave lip service to environmental 
protection especially climate change. Thus, East Asia has 
overlapping multilateral institutions such as the ARF (ASEAN Regional 
Forum) and APEC which include the US hegemon. It is not 
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inconceivable that the US would one day join the EAS to balance a 
rising China. 
China’s Rise: Peaceful or Hegemonic? 
East Asian regionalism cannot succeed without the participation of 
Japan and China. Beijing’s offer of an FTA to Southeast Asia in 2000 
and 2001 was politically motivated to give the Southeast Asian 
countries a stake in its rapid economic growth and also to reassure 
them that its intentions are indeed peaceful. Conceivably, it is 
desirable to China to be ringed by friendly neighbors than to be 
surrounded by Asian proxies of the US superpower which may seek to 
contain it in the future. 
 This Chinese FTA scheme triggered a counter offer from Tokyo in 
January 2002 --- a Japan-ASEAN Economic Partnership. While the 
ASEAN countries play the role of a Lego block to link China and 
Japan, an FTA between both Northeast Asian giants is not in the 
horizon, in part, due to their lack of a historical reconciliation over 
the Japanese imperial invasion of the Chinese mainland. Although 
Beijing claims that it is pursuing a “peaceful rise” (heiping jiaqi), 
many in Japan are suspicious of Chinese intentions. Indeed, many 
Japanese prefer the hegemon they know --- the US --- rather than a 
new local hegemon which is not a democracy and has traditionally 
viewed itself the Middle Kingdom at the center of the universe. A 
precondition for an East Asian regionalism to take off is a historical 
reconciliation between Beijing. This includes a “grand bargain” 
between the two ancient neighbors --- that the Japanese Prime 
Minister should not visit Yasukuni Shrine (the symbol of Japanese 
militarism to the Chinese and Koreans) and the Chinese must 
reciprocate by not playing the history card. In the tripod of East 
Asian regionalism (China-ASEAN, Japan-ASEAN and Sino-Japanese 
ties), the latter is undoubtedly the weakest link. 
 
The Future of East Asian regionalism 
2007 marks the 40th anniversary of ASEAN. Though ASEAN is seeking 
to transform itself into a political, economic and cultural 
community, it will probably take a long time to gel given the 
considerable differences in national interests, regime-types, stages 
of economic development and cultural heritage.  However, the fear 
that Southeast Asia will be overshadowed by the rise of China and 
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India will provide impetus for this region to seek greater regional 
cooperation. That the ASEAN states have enjoyed 40 years of 
experience at regional building and being non-threatening and 
accommodating to China and Japan means that they are acceptable 
to both Northeast Asian countries to be at the “driver’s seat” of East 
Asian regionalism. Whether the ASEAN states can be more than a 
taxi driver to the great powers remains to be seen but given the 
strategic competition and historical animosity between China and 
Japan mean that there is space for the smaller Southeast Asian 
countries to maneuver. Southeast Asia will be wooed by both 
Northeast Asian giants. 
While the US probably chaffs at being excluded from the EAS, it is 
still a key actor in East Asia with extensive military bases in Japan 
and South Korea, and formal alliances with not only Tokyo and Seoul 
but also Bangkok and the Philippines; it also has aircraft carrier 
berthing facilities in Singapore. Moreover, with the exception of the 
Shanghai stock exchange thus far, a cough in the New York stock 
exchange over the sub-prime housing mortgage issue often leads to a 
cold in East Asian markets. This phenomenon underscores the 
continual influence of American financial markets on the rest of the 
world. Nevertheless, East Asia is likely to make gradual progress as a 
region buoyed by the economic rise of China and India. Given the 
richness of its diverse civilizations, East Asia will be able to resist 
the cultural hegemony of the west. 
In the foreseeable future, the economic rise of China and India will 
lead to rising demands for raw resources including those from Africa. 
Even though both Asian giants have the size to resist dominance 
from the West and had a tradition of aligning itself with countries of 
the South, at least rhetorically, in the post-colonial world, it 
remains to be seen whether the Chinese and Indians will not exploit 
Africa like the West. The construction of East Asian regionalism is 
difficult and complex enough; to forge an Afro-Asian solidarity 
infused by the spirit of Bandung may be even more elusive. The 
challenge for the two continents is to avoid a new North-South 
relationship based on exploitation and resentment but to seek 
common grounds based on equality, humanity and environmental 
protection. In this regard, the ties between these two continents 
will be more enduring and meaningful if they stand for positive 
values and common good rather than against a global hegemony 
which is bent on self-destruction in Iraq. 
